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city's permit
did not come into
hands," and therefore was not entitled to
was accordingly rendered for defendant.

[1] First: TV as
fact that he did not
to
the
Yes. Section 106 of the San Franeisco
came effective
8, 1932
, reads:
works shall have and succeed to the
powers and duties of the Board of Public Works from and
after twelve o'clock noon on the 8th
of
1932."
Article VI, chapter I, section 9, subdivision 1 of San Francisco's Charter of 1900 (Stats.
pp. 286-287) read:
''The Board of Public vV orks shall have charge, superintendence and control, under such ordinances as may from
time to time be adopted
"1. Of all public ways,
avenues,
places,
courts,
and boulevards now
or which
may hereafter be
in the
; of the
manner of their use; and of all work done upon . . . the
same; and herein
the board shall have exclusive
authority to
*Plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the trial court's findings of fact.
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deem necessary, it may concur in the action
authorized to issue such . . .
or,
four members, may ovcrrnle the action of such
order that the
. . . be
or refnsecl.''
Section 335 of the San Frmwisco Pnblic
Code reads
: "It shall be nnlawfnl for any person . . . to
any excavation in . . . the surface of any
. . . 'IVithont first
from the
of
\Vorks a written ('rrtifirate that
rntitleil to make such rxeavation . . . . "
In
of the
of

established rule JS
r:able that one is not entitled to
relief until the pre-

auth

N1
that
did not exhaust his administrative remedies he was not entitled to
relief.
8 econcl: ·was
denied
because
did not come into court with "clean hands"?
Yes. [2] 'fhe rule is settled in California that
a party
as actor, seeks to set
tion and obtain some remedy, has violated
faith or other equitable principle in his prior conduct, then
the doors of the court will be shut against J1 im in
:
the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf to ackno-wledge
his right, or to afford him any remedy. (DeGarmo v.
man, 19 Cal.2d 755 at 764 [5] et seq.
P.2d 1]; Bowman
v. Bowman, 125 CaL~pp. 602 at 612
[13 P.2d 1049, 14
P.2d
.)
[3] The foregoing rule is applicable to the facts presented
in the instant case. The record discloses that plaintiff, without written permit and in violation of the San Francisco
Public vVorks Code, graded Argent Alley so as to make it
available for vehicular traffic when it had been previously
used solely for pedestrian traffic. By grading a roadway into
the alley without a permit, plaintiff circumvented the city's
permit procedure established for the protection of the public.
Upon either the granting or denial of a permit, the procedure
provided for an appeal to the board of permit
the applicant if the permit was denied; or, if granted, by any
person who deemed his interests or property would be adversely affected as the result of operations under the permit.
By ignoring the city's permit procedure and building the
road without a permit, then suing defendant, the Director of
Publie \YorkR, for a mandatory injunetion, plaintiff attempts
to nullify the procedure established by law, denies the public
the hearing to which it is entitled, and flouts the public interest ·which the procedure was designed to protect. Obviously the public, whom defendant represents, was injured
by plaintiff's illegal eonduet and the "clean hands" doctrine applies to him.
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as
level
the walk on eaeh
with no depression therein. The
ealled for the eurb in front of
to be
without the ensbreak and turning in of the eurbs found at intervehicular ways, and for a eonerete stairway to rise
from the street level to the sidewalk level in front of
A
civil scrviee examiner llamed Zion owned property
the northwest corner of Market Strret and
Alley.
the c-ity's
rlepartment, instead of
the concrete stairs as called for by the plans, to
"bnild this ramp up here so that lYe eonld use it for our
pm·•rn•Tv to move in."
"Without change in the official plans or change in the sideestablished by the supervisors, the engineering dertmrnt personnel caused the eontraetor to bnild a ramp
stairfl were called for, to shift the stairs 10 feet sonth.
awt to huilfl a 10- to 12-inch rlepression in the outer half of
side>Y::tlk to accommodate the ramp and
a veJ1ide
the ramp from han~ing up on the edge of the sidemilk The continuous curb was not
bnt a
was inserted between the enrb aml the street
a vehicle eonld cross the cnrb.
It is eon tended that this unlawful eonstrnetion for Zion';;;
lH•nefit and Zion's vehicular nse of the all\'Y for 15 years
r·onstitnted pnb1le aecrptanee of Argent Alley for vehicular
(although the pnblic had usef1 it exclusively as a pedessince 1867) and thrrrfore the nnauthorizrd eondnet of the rngineering departmPnt raised an estoppel against
thr public· and in faYor of plaintiff.
Snch i'l not tlw }mY. J\Ir. Cl1ief ,Jnstire Gibson, in CounhJ
San Dirr;o v. California Wafer & Tel. Co., 30 Ca1.2r1 817
826 f186 P.2d 124. 175 A.I.1.R. 747], thns aernratPly states

concurred.

proprelief against
clean hands rule or
exhaustion
administrative remedies since his act in parthe street has no connection with the closing
administrative
for the
holds that
the property
owner, may
obtain equitable relief for the closing of the
street
He did not have clean hands; and (2)
did not exhaust his administrative
afforded
u"''"u"""H"' the
of the
opinion, let
us examine the facts as
appear in the evidence and in
of the trial court. Plaintiff
his property in 1951. It has a house on it which fronts on 23d Street
in the middle of the block between Corbett and Market Streets.
while a public street, has never been
either pedestrian or vehicular traffic beHence
has no access, pedestrian
of his property ancl none to the rear
appears. The rear of his lot abuts on
established public street, and the one
It runs parallel to 23d Street. Argent is
pa''"nuLv for vehicles from Market Street to the rear
From there on to Corbett Street there are
for use
pedestrians. Plaintiff, finding Argent filled
with debris, obtained permission of defendant, head of the
department of public works, to clean it up and had a bull-
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here denies him relief
Plaintiff should not be denied

statrd in Carman v. A
P.2d 9261; 'The
hands" dortrine into
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roncluct must infect the cause
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Relief is not denied because the plaintiff may have acted
n,.".,..,"'"'" in the past or because such prior misconduct
affect the problem before the court. A party
have relief in connection with a transaction itself nnt<>lnh,,l
his
title may have been tainted
These principles are well settled.
107
532
165 Cal.
[131 P.
Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Pac. C. Co., 177 Cal. 577
P.
Equity ,Jurisprudence
ed.), p.
§ 399; cases collected 30 C.,J.S. p.
§ 98
; 4 A.L.R. 44
at p. 65.)'"
also Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Poe. Cable
177 Cal. 577 [171 P. 317]; Watson v. Poore,
18 CaL2d 302 [115 P.2d 478] ; Hamrick v. Hamrick, 119 Cal.
App.2d 839 [260 P.2d 188]; Boericlce v. Weise, 68 Cal.App.
2d 407 [156 P.2d 7811; -JYlcCarthy v. City of Oakland, 60 Cal.
App.2d 546 [141 P.2d 4]; Miller & L1.iX v. Enterprise etc.
Co., 142 Cal. 208 [75 P. 770, 100 Am.St.Rep. 115] ; Genna
1t!fg. Co. v. ·JJicClellan, 107 Cal.App. 532 [290 P. 534] ; Bradley
Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 242 [131 P. 750]; City of Los
Angeles v. Watterson, 8 Cal.App.2d 331 [48 P.2d 87].)
Here the only unlawful act charged against plaintiff is that
he graded Argent without obtaining a permit, but that does
not mean that he cannot complain of the closing of Argent.
They are unrelated transactions. If the conclusion of the
majority is correct, any time a citizen commits some minor
infraction with reference to public streets, he may be forever
barred from objecting to the dosing of a street because he
has unclean hands. The closing was not the result of the
grading of the street. It was an arbitrary action on defendant's part because he thought it was unsafe to permit vehicular
traffic on Argent.
The majority lumps together plaintiff's grading of Argent
with his alleged failure to exhaust an administrative remedy
as showing laek of clean hands. Certainly failure to exhaust
is not a showing of unclean hands and as will later appear
herein, plaintiff had no administrative remedy.
On the question of exhaustion of remedies, the majority
refers to plaintiff's failure to appeal to the board of permit
appeals after his application for a permit to pave Argent was
denied. No application was made for anything else and the
paving would have no effect on the closing of Argent. Even
if he had obtained a permit to pave, defendant would still
have closed Argent. Hence there was no administrative
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\.Vhrre an ordimwre contains
of hardship 11pon Ov\"ners
c~ases, resort to the administrative agency is
\Ve liitYe not been cited to any ease, and we have
J'onncl nonP,
that resort must be had to an adrninistraa;..;euey when the agency has no power to ad. In a 1mmber
cf cases where an ordinanee prohibited the doing of a parti<:nlar ad n a
district, direct application to the
r·onrts fo1· rrlief has been permitted and the ordinance held
nnconstitutional. Apparently in these cases there was no
for a variance in the ordinance. The question
whether an administrative
should have been rxhansted
not
or dis<·nssed. It seems clear, however, that it
110t clone bceanse there was no administrative remedy to
pnr:mr." ( Rernstc£n v.
83 Cal.App.2d 108. 115 [188
. ) Here the ehartcr and ordinantcs of San Franeiseo do not purport to give anyone the right to confer special
to m:e Argent, and the paving of it, as c;een, hac; no
r,•lation to the
of it. There is no law which
the
dirrr:tor of public works, any power to dose a
reet or to issue permits for the cnstomary and usnal use
·wllieh streets arc put such as vehicnlar and pedestrian
traffic; his power is limited to pe1·mits to use streets for pnrothrr than the eustomary onrs. rfhe chartrr proYisions
set forth in the majority opinion only
the director
and control over the streets and expressly
that permits for using them may be granted for any
purpose "other thnn such as orilinar£ly and
belonus
the
" 'l'hrre ean be no (]Urstion that nse of streets
fot· Yehic·ular traffi(' helongfl to the publi<' and h<>n<'e the <1iredor has no authority to grant or deny a permit in conner-
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In re J. David

In Bank

on Behalf of LYNN GRITTON
Habeas Corpus.

Licenses-Power to License or Tax-License Tax for Revenue.
of the state is opposed to the raising of
The
revenue
collection of direct taxes as a condition precedent
to the conduct of business.
Id.-Power to License or Tax-Power of Noncharter Counties.
-A noncharter county may require a legitimate business to
obtain a license if the eounty's purpose is to regulate or raise
funds to be used in regulating the business.
!d.-Construction of License Laws.-Where a eounty ordinance
ordinance
that the reguamended the
of the
were not to apply
movement of buildings onto property not subject to
county building code, and also provided that permits to
move buildings onto such premises "shall be issued upon application and payment of the required fee," on payment of such
fee a permit could not be denied.
!d.-Construction and Effect of License Laws.-Where the
board of supervisors affirmatively declared in an amended
ordinance that regulatory provisions of the original ordinance
were not to apply to movement of buildings into noncoded
in the
the court cannot reapply the regulatory
of the ordinance which the board explicitly exand a permit for movement of buildings into noncoded
cannot be denied on payment of the required fee;
hence an attempted enforcement of the amended ordinance
See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 26; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 7 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, § 7; [2] Licenses, § 3; [3, 4]
Licenses, § 16.
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